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Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and
Violence Against Women
JOHN BORROWS *
Violence against Indigenous women is a crisis of national proportions. Unfortunately, Indigenous
peoples have been prevented from arguing that Indigenous communities are a constitutional
site of activity for dealing with such violence. This article suggests that Aboriginal and treaty
rights under section 35 of the Constitution could play a significant role in ensuring that all levels
of government are seized with the responsibility for dealing with violence against women.
This article explores how section 35 could be reinterpreted in ways that place issues of
gender and violence at the heart of its analysis.
La violence faite aux femmes autochtones est une crise d’échelle nationale. Malheureusement,
on ne permet pas aux autochtones de faire valoir que leurs collectivités constituent un
endroit constitutionel ou on peut s’occuper de cette violence. Cet article suggère que les
droits autochtones et les droits issus des traités, reconnus et confirmés par l’article 35 de
la Constitution, pourraient jouer un rôle important pour faire en sorte que tous les paliers de
gouvernement soient saisis de la responsabilité d’aborder la violence faite aux femmes. Cet
article se penche sur la manière dont l’article 35 pourrait être réinterprété afin qu’il intègre
au cœur de son analyse les questions de sexe et de violence.
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INDIGENOUS WOMEN IN CANADA are beaten, sexually assaulted, and killed in
shockingly high numbers.1 They experience violence at rates three times higher
than other women.2 This violence is also extremely brutal in comparison to that
experienced by the general population.3 Indigenous women are five times more
likely to be killed or to disappear as compared to non-Indigenous women.4 They
also experience much higher rates of intimate partner violence than other women.5
Incarceration rates of Indigenous women are also greater than those of the
general population of women due, in part, to their response to this violence.6
There is a crisis in Canada’s criminal justice system relating to this issue,7 yet
there has been no significant constitutional response despite recommendations
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

“In 2009, close to 67,000 Aboriginal women aged 15 or older living in the Canadian
provinces reported being the victim of violence in the previous 12 months. Overall, the
rate of self-reported violent victimization among Aboriginal women was almost three times
higher than the rate of violent victimization reported by non-Aboriginal women. Close to
two-thirds (63%) of Aboriginal female victims were aged 15 to 34. This age group accounted
for just under half (47%) of the female Aboriginal population (aged 15 or older) living in
the ten provinces.” See Statistics Canada, Violent victimization of Aboriginal women in the
Canadian provinces, 2009 by Shannon Brennan (Ottawa: StatCan, 17 May 2011) at 5,
online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11439-eng.pdf> [Statistics
Canada]. For further commentary, see Anita Olsen Harper, “Is Canada Peaceful and Safe for
Aboriginal Women?” (2006) 25:1-2 Can Woman Stud 33 at 33, 36-37.
Statistics Canada, ibid at 7. For a more general discussion of Aboriginal women and the
law, see Patricia Monture, “Standing Against Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race,
Culture, and Gender” in Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender/Sexuality
Connections, 2d ed (Halifax: Fernwood, 2006) at 73-94.
See generally Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, The Justice System and
Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1 (Winnipeg:
Queen’s Printer, 1991) at 475-87 (Chairs: AC Hamilton & CM Sinclair) [Aboriginal Justice
Inquiry of Manitoba].
Amnesty International, “No More Stolen Sisters: The Need for a Comprehensive Response
to Discrimination and Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada” (London:
Amnesty International, 2009) at 1, online: <http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/
amr200122009enstolensistersupdate.pdf>.
Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Victimization and offending among the
Aboriginal population in Canada, vol 26:3 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006), online: <http://
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE-002-XIE2006003.pdf>.
Patricia Monture-Angus, “Women and risk: Aboriginal women, colonialism, and correctional
practice” (1999) 19:1-2 Can Woman Stud 24; Fran Sugar & Lana Fox, “Nistum Peyako
Seht’wawin Iskwewak: Breaking Chains” (1989-1990) 3:2 CJWL 465.
R v Gladue, 1999 SCC 679 at para 64, [1999] 1 SCR 688.
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in numerous high profile government reports.8 While federal legislative action
has directed judges to consider the special circumstances of Aboriginal peoples
in some instances,9 these efforts are woefully inadequate in addressing broader
issues of violence against women within and beyond Indigenous communities.10
At the same time, Indigenous women have demonstrated great leadership
in bringing issues of violence more fully into the public spotlight.11 They have
established shelters, arranged counselling, organized vigils, volunteered in

See Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr, Prosecution, Digest of
Findings and Recommendations (Halifax: The Commission, 1989) (Chair: T Alexander
Hickman); Ontario, The Osnaburgh-Windigo Tribal Council Justice Review Committee,
Report of the Osnaburgh-Windigo Tribal Council Review Committee (Toronto: Government
of Ontario, 1990) (Chair: Alan Grant); Canada, Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice
(Ottawa: The Commission, 1991); Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Report
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: The Justice System and Aboriginal People, vol 1
(Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991); Alberta, Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force
on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, vol
1 (Edmonton: The Task Force, 1991); Saskatchewan, Indian Justice Review Committee,
Report of the Saskatchewan Indian Justice Review Committee (Regina: The Committee, 1992)
(Chair: Patricia Linn); British Columbia, Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry, Report on
the Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry (Victoria: Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry, 1993)
(Commissioner: Anthony Sarich); Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Bridging the Cultural Divide: Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada
(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996); Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal
People, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Gathering Strength, vol 3
(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 54; Saskatchewan, Commission on First
Nations and Metis Peoples and Justice, Legacy of Hope: An Agenda for Change (Saskatoon,
The Commission, 2004); Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Ipperwash
Inquiry (Toronto, Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2007).
9. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.2(e). For further discussion of this issue, see
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: Balancing Offenders’ Needs, the
Interests of Victims and Society, and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples” (2007) 19:1
CJWL 179.
10. There is a “near fatal lack of resources” available for dealing with violence on reserves.
See Anne McGillivray & Brenda Comaskey, Black Eyes All of the Time: Intimate Violence,
Aboriginal Women, and the Justice System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)
at 79-80. See also Angela Cameron, “R v Gladue: Sentencing and the Gendered Impacts
of Colonialism” in John D Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008)
160; Angela Cameron, “Sentencing Circles and Intimate Violence: A Canadian Feminist
Perspective” (2006) 18 CJWL 479.
11. Neil Andersson et al, “Rebuilding from Resilience: Research Framework for a Randomized
Controlled Trial of Community-led Interventions to Prevent Domestic Violence in
Aboriginal Communities” (2010) 8:2 Pimatisiwin 61.

8.
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clinics, coordinated media campaigns, appeared before parliamentary committees,
cultivated the arts, worked in the civil service, and been elected as chiefs and
councilors—all with a firm public resolve to end violence against women.12 The
Native Women’s Association of Canada has long been at the forefront of these
efforts.13 Its advocacy, research, and on-the-ground efforts have made a huge
difference for thousands of people.14 In fact, Indigenous women across the country
have creatively developed detailed policy proposals and grassroots models
for dealing with violence against women.15 Their work includes support for
Indigenous self-determination that recognizes and affirms women’s rights.16 The
12. For example, see Native Women’s Association of Canada, online: <http://www.nwac.ca/
media> (for information about the broad array of activities undertaken by Indigenous
women to deal with the violence against women). See also National Aboriginal Circle Against
Family Violence, “Ending Violence in Aboriginal Communities: Best Practices” (Ottawa:
National Aboriginal Circle Against Family Violence, 2005).
13. Recently, the Assembly of First Nations has also become more active in addressing
violence against women. See “Demanding Justice and Fulfilling Rights: A Strategy to End
Violence Against Indigenous Women & Girls,” online: <http://www.afn.ca/uploads/files/
misssing_and_murdered_indigenous_women/afn_draft_strategy_to_ensure_rights_of_
indigenous_women_&_girls_e.pdf>.
14. The work of the Native Women’s Association of Canada was very significant in securing
Indian status for hundreds of thousands of people who were disenfranchised on a sexually
discriminatory basis. See Janet Silman, Enough is Enough: Aboriginal Women Speak Out
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1987). Loss of status made Aboriginal women more vulnerable to
violence because of the precarious position in which they were placed relative to Indian men.
Indian women’s inability to reside or own property on reserve, participate in the political
life of the community, and access the support of extended family and kin exposed them
to greater challenges in confronting and fleeing abuse. The work of the Native Women’s
Association of Canada and their allies helped address some of these challenges. See McIvor v
Canada (Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs), 2009 BCCA 153, 306 DLR (4th) 193.
15. For examples of advocacy, see Native Women’s Association of Canada, “What Their Stories
Tell Us: Research findings from the Sisters In Spirit initiative” (Ottawa: 2010), online:
<http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/imce/2010_NWAC_SIS_Report_EN_Lite.pdf>
[What Their Stories Tell Us]; Jeannette Corbiere Lavell, “Statement of the Native Women’s
Association of Canada et al.: Combating violence against Indigenous women and girls,
Article 22 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (delivered
at the Eleventh Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, NY,
7-18 May 2012), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/imce/UNPFII%20
11th%20Session%20-NWAC%20and%20AFN%20Statement%20on%20VAIWG%20
-%20May%2010%202012.pdf>. For protocols dealing with sexual violence in Aboriginal
communities, see Jarem Sawatsky, The Ethic of Traditional Communities and the Spirit of
Healing Justice: Studies from Hollow Water, the Iona Community, and Plum Village (London,
UK: Jessica Kingsley, 2009).
16. Sharon McIvor, “Aboriginal Women’s Rights as “Existing Rights” (1995) 15:2-3 Can Woman
Stud 34.

BORROWS, ABORIGINAL & TREATY RIGHTS 703

knowledge and experience of these women—and, in particular, their poignant
calls for structural change—must be heeded.17
Despite these efforts, violence against women has not received the attention
it deserves. Political discourse within Indigenous communities is strongly
influenced by how Indigenous issues have been framed by the courts. In particular,
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198218 has taken centre stage in these
debates. It has spawned a political approach that largely emphasizes land and
resource conflicts between the Crown and Indigenous governments to the exclusion
of other human rights issues. As a result, too many chiefs and leaders have
become overly focused on issues recognized by the courts, inadvertently drawing
attention away from pressing structural inequalities related to violence against
Indigenous women. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable for leaders to devote
their attention to matters that have gained broader legal traction in the judicial
realm, because Canadian governments do not generally respond to Indigenous
issues unless courts compel them to take action. On the other hand, since the
courts are not particularly sensitive to Indigenous peoples’ lived realities, Indigenous
leaders must ensure that their political agendas are not solely dictated by what
judges regard as being central to section 35(1) jurisprudence.
To help refocus Indigenous political discourse surrounding section 35(1),
this article argues that Indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights must be
reframed and transformed in ways that address other pressing needs including,
most importantly, violence against women. This reframing should be done with
the recognition that, beyond the results of formal litigation, section 35(1) has
great significance for political struggles both external and internal to Indigenous
communities.19 As such, this article explores the connections between Indigenous
17. For commentary on Native women’s advocacy related to violence against women, see Native
Women’s Association of Canada, “Gendering Reconciliation, Arrest the Legacy, From
Residential Schools to Prisons” (Ottawa, 2012), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/genderingreconciliation>; Wendee Kubik, Carrie Bourassa & Mary Hampton, “Stolen Sisters,
Second Class Citizens, Poor Health: The Legacy of Colonization in Canada” (2009) 33:1-2
Humanity & Soc’y 18.
18. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act].
19. In a related context, the political nature of constitutional discourse is discussed in Joel
Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997); Alan Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Laws and Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995); Ted Morton & Rainer Knopf, The Charter Revolution and
the Court Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Michael Mandel, The Charter
of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson, 1989); Christopher
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001); Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The
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governance and violence against women while placing these issues more squarely
in a political light. It argues that Indigenous communities should be regarded
as possessing shared constitutional responsibility for addressing violence against
women. Unless section 35(1) becomes a site of political action related to violence
against women, Indigenous women and their allies will not be sufficiently
empowered to affect the development of the national and local policies necessary
to create lasting change.20
Part I of this article discusses why responsibility for addressing violence
against women has not been considered as lying within the sphere of section
35(1) and outlines critical responses to these concerns. Part II analyzes the Supreme
Court of Canada’s (SCC) exceedingly narrow interpretation of Aboriginal and
treaty rights and considers why jurisdiction related to violence against women
would not likely be affirmed under the SCC’s current dominant interpretive
approach. Part III identifies alternative means of recognizing and affirming
Indigenous peoples’ responsibilities for dealing with violence against women within
existing section 35(1) jurisprudence. Canada’s Constitution could readily embrace
approaches that put the health, well-being, and safety of Indigenous women at
the centre of community life. If decision makers were willing to treat Indigenous
rights not only as flowing from historic sources but also as rooted in contemporary
jurisdictional concerns, section 35(1) could make a significant difference to
everyday political discourse and practice concerning violence against women.

I. THE PROBLEM AND/OR THE ANSWER?: INDIGENOUS
SELF-DETERMINATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN
Law influences and is intertwined with politics;21 thus, any attempt to change
the discourse relating to violence against women within and beyond Indigenous
Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
20. “For Indigenous women, the systematic violation of their collective rights as Indigenous
People is the single greatest risk factor for gender based violence – including violence
perpetrated within their communities.” See Mairin Iwanka Raya, “Indigenous Women Stand
Against Violence: A Companion Report to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Study on
Violence Against Women” (International Indigenous Women’s Forum:
New York, 2006) at 7, online: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/
vaiwreport06.pdf>.
21. Robert A Williams Jr, “Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice,” (1997) 95:4 Mich
Law Rev 741; Robert A Williams Jr, “Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of
Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color,” (1987) 5:1 L & Inequality 103.
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communities must address the question: Why is there no section 35(1) jurisprudence dealing with this issue? At one level, the answer is simple: Section 35(1)
does not specifically deal with violence against Indigenous women because, thus
far, courts have not construed these powers as falling within Indigenous peoples’
jurisdiction. At another level, there is no jurisprudence recognizing Indigenous
jurisdiction in this field because Indigenous communities are not fully trusted
to deal effectively with violence against women.22 These two issues, jurisdiction
and trust, are intertwined, and the relationship between them cannot be easily
disentangled. For example, if Indigenous peoples attempted to assume fuller legal
responsibility related to violence against women, a lack of official recognition
would leave them without the resources and broader support necessary to realize
tangible change related to actual on-the-ground attitudes, activity, and service
delivery. Resulting failures would further fuel negative perceptions of Indigenous
justice and diminish government and community willingness to support official
recognition of jurisdiction in the future. Understanding the vital connection
between active, supportive recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction and its proper
implementation should reinforce our awareness of the fact that law and politics are
not distinct fields. This article therefore contextualizes violence against women in
a broader constitutional light.23
Thus, if communities are going to deal effectively with violence against
women, it is essential to interrogate why Indigenous peoples currently lack
official jurisdictional recognition in this field. The first point to note is that the
failure to recognize Indigenous governance is part of a broader dilemma that
Indigenous people encounter before the courts. The SCC has limited its discussion of Indigenous governance to very few cases and has not, contrary to its
own admonition, taken a large, liberal and generous approach to this issue.24 For
22. See e.g. Teressa Nahanee, “Dancing with a Gorilla: Aboriginal Women, Justice & the
Charter” (Paper delivered at the Round Table on Justice Issues 2004-2005), online: <http://
www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/reports/DancingwithaGorilla.pdf>; Thomas Flanagan, First
Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000); Frances Widdowson &
Albert Howard, Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: The Deception Behind Indigenous Cultural
Preservation (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008).
23. Val Napoleon discusses the need for a broader political and gendered analysis of Indigenous
issues. See “Aboriginal Feminism in a Wider Frame” (2007) 41:3 Canadian Dimension 44.
24. The SCC has held that Aboriginal and treaty rights should be construed in broad ways
that favour Aboriginal interpretations. See R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 9,
137 DLR (4th) 648; R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der
Peet cited to SCR]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th)
193 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR]; R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54, 274 DLR (4th) 75
[Sappier]; R v Taylor and Williams, 34 OR (2d) 360, [1981] 3 CNLR 114 (CA) [Taylor and
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example, in R v Pamajewon, the first decision to discuss Indigenous governance
explicitly under section 35(1), the SCC held that Indigenous communities could
not claim broad management rights over reserve lands.25 While the Court’s reasons
have not escaped critical commentary,26 this narrow framing all but halted
the advancement of successful self-governance claims under section 35(1).27 The
Pamajewon decision was reinforced one year later in Delgamuukw v The Queen,
in which the SCC declined to address issues related to self-governance because
of the “difficult conceptual issues” raised by this claim.28 Both of these decisions

25.
26.

27.

28.

Williams cited to OR]; R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387, 24 DLR (4th) 390 [Simon cited to
SCR]; R v Horseman, [1990] 1 SCR 901 at paras 2-4, 4 WWR 97 [Horseman]; R v Badger,
[1996] 1 SCR 771 at paras 4, 41, 133 DLR (4th) 324 [Badger]; R v Sundown, [1999] 1
SCR 393 at paras 24-25, 170 DLR (4th) 385 [Sundown]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456
at paras 9-14, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [Marshall]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at para 19,
179 DLR (4th) 193; R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para
26 [R v Marshall; R v Bernard]; R v Morris, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 SCR 915 at para 19
[Morris]. The leading cases in the United States applying similar canons of construction are
United States v Winans, 198 US 371, 371 NE (2d) 127 (1905); Winters v United States, 207
US 564 at 576-77, 564 SE (2d) 802 (1908); Choate v Trapp, 224 US 665 at 675, 32 S Ct
565 (1912); Carpenter v Shaw, 280 US 363 at 367, 50 S Ct 121 (1930); Choctaw Nation v
United States, 318 US 423 at 431-32, 423 NE (2d) 900 (1943); McClanahan v Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 US 164 at 174, 93 S Ct 1257 (1973); Minnesota v Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians 526 US 172 at 195-98, 119 S Ct 1187 (1999).
R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821 at para 27, 138 DLR (4th) 204 [Pamajewon].
See Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 Sup Ct L
Rev (2d) 595 [Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights”]; Kent McNeil,
“Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47:3 McGill LJ 473;
Russell L Barsh & James Y Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive
Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42:4 McGill LJ 993; Bradford Morse, “Permafrost
Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R v Pamajewon” (1997) 42:4
McGill LJ 1011; John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and
the Trickster” (1998) 22 Am Indian L Rev 37.
R v Ignace (1998), 156 DLR (4th) 713 at para 11, 103 BCAC 273; Mississaugas of Scugog
Island First Nation v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers
Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 444, 2007 ONCA 814, 287 DLR (4th) 452
[Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation]; Sawridge Band v Canada, 2006 FC 1501 at
para 42, [2006] 4 CNLR 279; Mitchell v Minister of National Revenue, 2001 SCC 33 at
paras 125-26, [2001] 1 SCR 911 [Mitchell]; NIL/TU, Child and Family Services Society v
BC Government and Service Employees’ Union (23 March 2006), B72/2006 at paras 54-66,
online: BCLRB <http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/B072$2006.pdf>; NIL/TU,O Child and
Family Services Society v BC Government and Service Employees’ Union, 2010 SCC 45 at para
80, [2010] 2 SCR 696. Note how the claim to Indigenous governance virtually disappeared
by the time NIL/TU,O v BC Government got to the SCC because of the narrow reading of
Pamajewon in the lower court (supra note 25).
Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at paras 170-71.
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created a void at the centre of section 35(1) jurisprudence. Section 35(1) allows
communities to claim rights in relation to historically specific practices but has
been interpreted in a way that simultaneously denies them the means to organize
their broader social relationships.29 This has suppressed Indigenous governmental
activity and innovation in responding to the crisis of violence against Indigenous
women within their own communities and beyond.
Contrast this situation with the constitutional circumstances of Native
American tribes in the United States, which possess inherent authority to exercise
criminal and civil jurisdiction on their reserves.30 Tribal power in the United
States flows from a legally recognized, autonomous, and inherent source of sovereignty that existed before the country’s creation and survives to the present day.31
While this authority is subject to the judicially created federal plenary power to
regulate Native American affairs32 and is constrained by legislative restrictions
crafted in this light,33 tribes still possess substantial inherent powers related to
their internal governance.34 For example, the US Bill of Rights35 does not apply
directly to tribes,36 and while the federal government has passed legislation
directing tribes to protect their members’ rights,37 these laws cannot generally be
enforced in federal courts and, therefore, must be secured before tribal courts.38
Thus, as a practical matter, tribes in the United States have significant jurisdiction

29. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal
Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012).
30. For the first case dealing with tribal criminal jurisdiction, see Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 US
556 (1883), 3 S Ct 396. For commentary on this case, see Sidney Harring, Crow Dog’s
case: American Indian sovereignty, tribal law, and United States law in the nineteenth century
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For the leading case dealing with tribal
civil jurisdiction, see Williams v Lee, 358 US 217, 79 S Ct 269 (1959).
31. Johnson v McIntosh, 21 US 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823); Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia, 30
US 1, 8 L Ed 25 (1831). These principles were reaffirmed in United States v Lara, 541 US
193, 124 S Ct 1628 (2004).
32. For critical discussions of the plenary power, see Nell Jessup Newton, “Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Scope, Sources and Limitations” (1984) 132:2 U Pa L Rev 195; Philip P Frickey,
“Domesticating Federal Indian Law” (1996) 81 Minn L Rev 31:1; Robert N Clinton, “There
is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes” (2002) 34:1 Ariz St LJ 113; David H
Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law” (1996) 84:6 Cal L Rev 1573.
33. The Major Crimes Act, 18 USC § 1153 (1885) (outlining some of these limits).
34. United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 98 S Ct 1079 (1978).
35. US Const amends I-X.
36. Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376, 16 S Ct 986 (1896).
37. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(8) (1968).
38. Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 98 S Ct 1670 (1978).
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to legislate and adjudicate issues related to violence against women.39 As a result,
tribes and tribal courts have taken important steps in addressing this issue even
as substantial work remains to be done.40 The recognition that legal rights vest
Indigenous governments with responsibilities for dealing with violence against
women greatly aids political action in this field.
Unfortunately, Indigenous women in Canada are denied similar rights and
corresponding access to political power, both of which are essential to their
safety and to their communities’ broader health. This must change. Indigenous
peoples must be regarded as partners in Confederation who are capable of
exercising jurisdiction related to the country’s most pressing social and political
issues.41 They cannot effectively participate in the creation of healthy societies
if they do not have the jurisdictional tools to address the violence and social dysfunction that plague too many communities. While the exercise of such power will
not eradicate violence against women (the causes of and solutions to which go
much deeper than constitutional reform), social distress could nevertheless be
modestly yet meaningfully curtailed if authority and resources were available
to address violence against women.42 Unless Indigenous governance structures,
such as councils, courts, and clans, address issues central to the safety of
Indigenous women, they will continue to be marginalized within Canada and
within their communities.43 Violence against women does not only arise from
poor interpersonal relationships; rather, it is connected to larger social structures
of inequality that can be found in any society.44 Violence against women is,
therefore, intimately linked with the broader colonial context that Aboriginal
rights are designed to address.45 Without recognizing the links between violence
39. For a general overview of the issue of violence against women on Indian reservations, see
Sarah Deer et al, eds, Sharing Our Stories of Survival: Native Women Surviving Violence
(Lanham: AltaMira, 2008).
40. Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P Zuni, “Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of
Indigenous Women in the United States” (1995) 69 St John’s L Rev 69.
41. Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993).
42. Resources are also greatly needed to deal with violence against women. For an in-depth study
of poverty and federal policy on reserves, see Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep them Alive’:
Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
43. Foundational flaws resting at the base of constitutional law must be exposed, nullified, and
repaired to effectively address this issue. See Gordon Christie, “Judicial Justification of a
Recent Development in Aboriginal Law?” (2002) 17:2 CJLS 41.
44. See Hillary N Weaver, “The Colonial Context of Violence: Reflections on Violence in the
Lives of Native American Women” (2009) 24:9 J Interpersonal Violence 1552; Kiera L
Ladner, “Gendering Decolonisation, Decolonising Gender” (2009) 13:1 AILR 62.
45. For a discussion of how colonization is linked with violence against women, see Andrea
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against Indigenous women and male-dominated colonial structures, Indigenous
women will remain subject to staggeringly high levels of violence “since violence
against women is one of the key means through which male control over women’s
agency and sexuality is maintained.”46 Thus, the web of oppressive and unequal
relationships within which Indigenous women are enmeshed must be addressed
as part and parcel of violence against women if the issue is to work its way onto
the constitutional agenda.47
While the recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction would be an important
step in addressing violence against women, one might appropriately ask whether
violence against women would receive the attention and action it deserves if
Indigenous peoples were recognized as possessing responsibility in this field.48
To engage with this question is to acknowledge the broader issues of trust in
Indigenous governance that lie behind the legal discourse. At present, Indigenous
communities can be as oppressive and dismissive of this issue as other levels of
Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, Mass: South
End Press, 2005); Mary Ellen Turpel, “Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the
Canadian State for Women” (1993) 6:1 CJWL 174. For a discussion of how s 35(1) is
designed to address colonialism, see R v Sparrow, [1997] 1 SCR 1075 at 412, 70 DLR (4th)
385 [Sparrow]; Delgamuukw, supra note 24; R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at paras 59, 177
DLR (4th) 513 [Côté].
46. The connection was made at page one of the Executive Summary of a 2006 Report prepared
for the General Assembly, detailing global violence against women. See Secretary-General,
Ending violence against women: from words to action: Study of the Secretary General, UN Doc
A/61/122/Add.1 (2006) at 1.
47. For extended scholarship on this issue, see the following works by Patricia A Monture:
“Women’s Words: Power, Identity, and Indigenous Sovereignty” (2008) 26:3 Can Woman
Stud 154; “Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah” (1986) 2:1 CJWL 159; Thunder
My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 1995); “Standing Against
Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race, Culture and Gender” (1998) 2 YBNZ Juris 7;
“Women and Risk: Aboriginal Women, colonialism, and correctional practice” (1999) 19:12 Can Woman Stud 24; “The Violence We Women Do: A First Nations View” in Constance
Backhouse & David H Flaherty, eds, Challenging Times: The Women’s Movement in Canada
and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) 193; “The Roles and
Responsibilities of Aboriginal Women: Reclaiming Justice” (1992) 56:2 Sask L Rev 237.
48. For a discussion of the care required in asking and addressing this question, see Maneesha
Deckha, “Gender, Difference, and Anti-Essentialism: Towards a Feminist Response to
Cultural Claims in Law” in Avigail Eisenberg, ed, Diversity and Equality: The Changing
Framework of Freedom in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 114; Emma LaRocque,
“Re-examining Culturally Appropriate Models in Criminal Justice Applications” in Michael
Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 75; Kim Anderson, “Affirmations of an Indigenous
Feminist” in Cheryl Suzack et al, eds, Indigenous Women and Feminism: Politics, Activism,
Culture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 81.
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government.49 As is the case with most political communities,50 male domination
is a troubling fact of life.51 In fact, an early report of the Manitoba Justice Inquiry
proclaimed that Indigenous political leaders were a large part of the problem in
perpetuating violence within Indigenous communities.52 The Commissioners of
the Inquiry wrote:
The unwillingness of chiefs and councils to address the plight of women and children
suffering abuse at the hands of husbands and fathers is quite alarming. We are
concerned enough about it to state that we believe that the failure of Aboriginal
government leaders to deal at all with the problem of domestic abuse is unconscionable. We believe that there is a heavy responsibility on Aboriginal leaders to
recognize the significance of the problem within their own communities. They must
begin to recognize, as well, how much their silence and failure to act actually
contribute to the problem.53

While these words were written over twenty years ago and constructive change
within some Indigenous political circles has occurred over the last few decades,54
there is no reason to believe that Indigenous communities are enlightened
49. This was particularly the case during the early 1990s when constitutional discussions
excluded Aboriginal women’s groups. See John Borrows, “Contemporary Traditional
Equality: The Effect of the Charter on First Nations Politics” (1994) 43:1 UNBLJ 19; Sharon
Donna McIver, “Self-Government and Aboriginal Women” in Enakshi Dua & Angela
Robertson, eds, Scratching the Surface: Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Thought (Toronto:
Women’s Press, 1999) 167; Lilianne Ernestine Krosenbrink-Gelissen, Sexual Equality as an
Aboriginal Right: The Native Women’s Association of Canada and the Constitutional Process on
Aboriginal Matters, 1982-1987 (Saarbrücken: Verlag Breitenbach, 1991).
50. Carol Gilligan & David AJ Richards, The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and
Democracy’s Future (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
51. For a good overview of the struggle faced by Indigenous women in the face of male
dominance, see Sharon McIvor, “Aboriginal Women Unmasked: Using Equality Litigation to
Advance Women’s Rights” in Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and
Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 96. For another viewpoint, see Kim Anderson,
“Leading by Action: Female Chiefs and the Political Landscape in Restoring the Balance” in
Gail Guthrie Valaskakis, Madeleine Dion Stout & Eric Guimond, eds, Restoring the Balance:
First Nations Women, Community, and Culture (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press,
2009) 99.
52. For an example of the failure of some First Nations leaders in Manitoba to deal with sexual
violence in the child welfare context see Ruth Teichroeb, Flowers on my Grave: How an
Ojibwa Boy’s Death Helped Break the Silence on Child Abuse (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1997).
53. Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra note 3 at 487.
54. Aboriginal organizations have called for inquiries and action to deal with violence against
women, particularly in relation to murdered and missing Aboriginal women. See Native
Women’s Association of Canada, “Collaboration to End Violence: National Aboriginal
Women’s Forum” (27 July 2011), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/imce/
BC%20MARR%20Reports%20Compiled%20July%2027%202011%20w%20Dig.pdf>.
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havens of gender sensitivity when it comes to addressing violence against women.55
Significant problems remain56 despite encouraging signs of change related to this
issue within Indigenous communities.57
From many vantage points, therefore, the troubling levels of violence within
Indigenous communities might be considered a reason for denying jurisdiction
to Indigenous peoples.58 People will reasonably wonder whether societies with
this degree of trauma are capable of dealing with violence against women. These
essential questions must be addressed squarely. To be certain, safety must be a
paramount concern in addressing violence against women.59 Reserves can be
dangerous places at times, and jurisdictional and other reforms should acknowledge and work in light of this fact.60 At the same time we must not lose sight
of the strength, creativity, and resilience of Indigenous women and their allies
on the reserves and beyond; their knowledge and experience is a key source of
power in addressing violence at many levels.61 It must be recognized that there
are many places within Indigenous communities where people enjoy safe and
healthy lives.62 We should take care to avoid painting all Indigenous peoples

55. Emma LaRocque, “Violence in Aboriginal Communities” in Katherine MJ McKenna & June
Larkin, eds, Violence Against Women: New Canadian Perspectives (Toronto: Inanna, 2002) at 147.
56. Douglas A Brownridge, “Understanding the Elevated Risk of Partner Violence Against
Aboriginal Women: A Comparison of Two Nationally Representative Surveys of Canada”
(2008) 23 J Fam Violence 353; “Male Partner Violence against Aboriginal Women in
Canada: An Empirical Analysis” (2003) 18:1 J Interpersonal Violence 65.
57. Wayne Warry, Unfinished dreams: community healing and the reality of aboriginal selfgovernment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 160-62.
58. For example, in past constitutional debates the concerns of Aboriginal women were not
adequately taken into account. See Joyce Green, “Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy:
Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal Government” (1992) 4:1 Const Forum 110.
59. Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 155-74.
60. A tragically poignant example of the failure to recognize this fact is recorded in Jane Doe v
Awasis Agency of Northern Manitoba (1990), 67 Man R (2d) 260, 72 DLR (4th) 738 (CA).
61. Those who have experienced violence usually have a good of idea of which actions are
effective and which are not in this field. See, more generally, Francine Pickup, Suzanne
Williams & Caroline Sweetman, Ending Violence Against Women: A Challenge for Development
and Humanitarian Work (Oxford: Oxfam, 2001).
62. Boyce Richardson, ed, Drum Beat: anger and renewal in Indian country (Ottawa:
Summerhill Press, 1989) at 137-66; Leanne Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back: Stories
of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence, and a New Emergence (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring,
2011). For a discussion of how Aboriginal communities actually contribute positively to
Canadian society, see Cora Voyageur, David Newhouse & Daniel Beavon, eds, Hidden in
Plain Sight: contributions of Aboriginal peoples to Canadian identity and culture (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2005).
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with the same brush.63 Trauma, while widespread, is not the norm in every
place throughout Aboriginal Canada.64 Furthermore, we should also reject the
assumption that communities experiencing deep levels of violence are incapable
of dealing with this issue, given the proper resources and legal tools.65 People are
able to change their lives amidst the most trying conditions.66 While addressing
violence is certainly more challenging in such contexts, and requires a significant
level of support as noted above, much can be accomplished.67 Thus, while we
should always be deeply concerned about any (Indigenous or non-Indigenous)
community’s ability to effectively address violence against women, these issues
should always be considered in a more nuanced light.
Secondly, it must be acknowledged that Canadian governments have
not responded effectively to the nationwide crisis involving violence against
Indigenous women.68 In fact, even as women’s organizations across Canada have
been advocating for additional attention to, and services for, addressing violence
against women (among other matters), they have suffered across-the-board cuts
to their public funding.69 Furthermore, repeated calls by national Aboriginal
63. Some communities have taken positive steps to address violence against women. See Jarem
Sawatsky, The ethic of traditional communities and the spirit of healing justice: studies from
Hollow Water, the Iona Community, and Plum Village (London, UK: Jessica Kingsley, 2009).
Furthermore, the complexities of membership in multiple communities must be considered
in dealing with violence against Aboriginal women. See Rauna Kuokkanen, “Intersectionality
and Violence against Indigenous Women” (2013) CJWL [forthcoming].
64. I have addressed this issue in John Borrows, “Seven Generations, Seven Teachings: Ending
the Indian Act” National Centre for First Nations Governance, online: <http://fngovernance.
org/resources_docs/7_Generations_7_Teachings.pdf>.
65. For a discussion of the ability of traumatized communities to positively respond amidst
violence, see Jack Rothman et al, eds, Strategies of Community Intervention: Macro
Practice, 5th ed (Itasca, IL: FE Peacock, 1995); Jack Rothman, ed, Reflections on Community
Organization: Enduring Themes and Critical Issues (Itasca, IL: FE Peacock, 1999); Barbara
Levy Simon, The Empowerment Tradition in American Social Work: A History (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994).
66. See generally Monica McGoldrick, ed, Re-Visioning Family Therapy: Race, Culture and Gender
in Clinical Practice (New York: Guilford Press, 1998).
67. For examples and a discussion of this issue, see Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness:
An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gerald R Alfred, Heeding
the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of
Action and Freedom (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2005).
68. Rupert Ross, “Traumatization in Remote First Nations: An Expression of Concern” (2006)
[unpublished, on file with author].
69. For a list of Women’s and Indigenous organizations that have had their funding cut by
the federal government in recent years see Gina Starblanket, Beyond Culture in the Courts:
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organizations for the Canadian government to address violence against Indigenous women have been met with responses that do not confront the problem’s
systemic nature.70 The same situation largely prevails within the provinces, where
governments have not taken the initiative to address violence against Indigenous
women structurally. In fact, even in those rare cases in which provinces have
acted, their processes have been framed in excessively narrow terms. For example,
commissions of inquiry have been established to examine select issues related
to violence against Indigenous women in British Columbia71 and Manitoba,72
but the governments’ limited focus has generally failed to generate support from
the most affected Indigenous communities.73 Moreover, the existence of Charter
rights protecting, inter alia, life, liberty, security, and equality has had little influence in addressing this issue.74 Broader structural change is needed but has not
been forthcoming.75 The failure of federal and provincial governments to deal

70.

71.

72.

73.
74.

75.

Re-inspiring Approaches to Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canadian Jurisprudence (MA
Thesis, University of Victoria, Department of Political Science, 2012) [unpublished] at
89-90, online: <http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/3914/Gina%20
Starblanket%20UVic%20MA%20Thesis%20DSpace.pdf?sequence=3>.
See Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada, “National Strategy to Prevent Abuse in Inuit
Communities” (Ottawa: Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada, 2006), online: Inuit Women of
Canada <www.pauktuutit.ca>.
British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, Forsaken: The Report of the
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry: Executive Summary (British Columbia: The Inquiry,
2012), online: <www.missingwomeninquiry.ca>.
Manitoba has created an Integrated Task Force for Murdered and Missing Women as a joint
effort between the government of Manitoba, the RCMP, and the Winnipeg Police Services.
See Government of Manitoba, News Release, “Integrated Task Force Formed – Cases of
Missing and Murdered Women to be Subject of Enhanced Scrutiny” (26 August 2009),
online: <http://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=6621>.
Jennifer Koshan, “Aboriginal Women, Justice and the Charter: Bridging the Divide?” (1998)
32:1 UBC L Rev 23 at 1.
Diane Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration”
(2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 297 at 320. Majury observes: “Violence against women is
probably the area in which section 15 has been most frequently argued before the Supreme
Court of Canada.” Despite this attention, Aboriginal women, as Aboriginals and women,
have not received sustained attention from the courts under the Charter.
“[T]he root causes and major sites of violence against Aboriginal women have been theorized
too narrowly, and solutions proposed and implemented … have not been responsive to
the needs of Aboriginal women.” Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private
Dichotomy, Violence and Aboriginal Women” in Susan Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/
Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997) at 88-89. For a broader analysis of Canada’s failure to address issues facing Aboriginal
women, see Mary Ellen Turpel, “Patriarchy and Paternalism: The Legacy of the Canadian
State for First Nations Women” (1993) 6:1 CJWL 174.
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meaningfully with violence against Indigenous women shows that the status quo
is not working.76 Any even-handed assessment of Indigenous jurisdiction related
to violence against women must take account of this fact.
Thirdly, in considering Indigenous jurisdiction in relation to violence against
women, it should be acknowledged that Aboriginal governance rights exercised
under section 35(1) would not be exclusive. For example, Canadian governments can justify infringements of section 35(1) rights if the Crown’s actions
are honourable and in accordance with valid objectives.77 Thus, if Indigenous
governance powers in relation to violence against women were recognized and
deployed, the Canadian government could always aid or modify this exercise
through consultation and accommodation in accordance with its other obligations
under section 35(1).78 Nevertheless, this shared framework would not give the
Crown an unfettered license to impose unjustifiable burdens on Indigenous
actions addressing violence against women. Section 35(1) constrains Crown
sovereignty by serving as a check against arbitrary government action. As the
SCC observed in Sparrow, section 35(1) “gives a measure of control over government
conduct and a strong check on legislative power.”79 The fact that Indigenous
sovereignty limits that of the Crown when section 35(1) is at issue should be
more explicitly conceded. This is one of the most significant implications of the
constitutional requirement that infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights be
justified by valid governmental objectives, which are pursued honourably and in
good faith.80 In this light, Indigenous governance would be regarded as functioning
analogously to the checks and balances of federalism—that is, working in a
cooperative, coordinated way with the other levels of government. This means
that Crown sovereignty should appropriately constrain Indigenous sovereignty,
and vice versa, in dealing with the practical jurisdictional questions concerning
violence against women.81 Such an approach would enhance Indigenous governance
76. See also Sherene H Razack, “Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: The Murder
of Pamela George” (2000) 15:2 CJLS 91.
77. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 64.
78. John Borrows, “Let Obligations Be Done” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy
Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2007) at 130.
79. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 65.
80. Governments in Canada do not function as watertight compartments within Canada’s
constitutional scheme. See AG Canada v AG Ontario (The Labour Conventions Case), [1937]
AC 326 at 354, [1937] 1 DLR 673.
81. If the Constitution does not equalize the Crown’s power to infringe Indigenous jurisdiction
with Indigenous peoples’ power to infringe Crown jurisdiction in a coordinated, harmonized
manner then critiques regarding the unilateral, coercive nature of Crown sovereignty made
by the following scholars could be further strengthened. See, Gordon Christie, “Judicial
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as well as Canadian responses to ensure that violence against women is dealt with
in ways that draw upon the strengths of all jurisdictions across the land.82
Furthermore, it should be noted that Indigenous peoples’ governmental
responsibilities regarding Indigenous women under section 35(1) would also be
subject to section 35(4), which states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons.”83 This provision is an important bulwark
against innovations that could otherwise undermine Indigenous women’s rights.
It must be remembered that this section would likely have its greatest impact on
political discourse and practices; it would only take one or two cases under
section 35(4) to generate a political discourse more explicitly attentive to section
35(1)’s gender equality implications. This increased emphasis on gender equality would
reinforce the idea that distinctions adversely impacting Indigenous women could
not be sustained under section 35(1) as they would run contrary to section
35(4)’s protections.84 Thus, every time an Indigenous community exercised its
governance jurisdiction under the Constitution, including matters related to
Indigenous women, such authority would be subject to an overriding constraint
protecting gender equality found in section 35(4).85 While not completely

82.

83.

84.

85.

Justification of a Recent Development in Aboriginal Law?” (2002) 17:2 CJLS 41; Kent
McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33:2 Ottawa L Rev 301; Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds, Box of
Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton: Theytus Books, 2003).
The dominant judicial approach to Indigenous governance in Canada regards jurisdiction as
being exercised through overlapping spheres. See Starr v Houlden, [1990] 1 SCR 1366, 68
DLR (4th) 641. Indigenous governance under s 35(1) should be treated as also operating in
ways that overlap with federal and provincial governments.
Constitution Act, supra note 18, s 35(4). For a discussion of s 35(4)’s place in the Constitution,
see Dancing Around the Table, Part 1 and Part 2 (Ottawa: National Film Board, 1987),
online: <http://www.nfb.ca/film/dancing_around_the_table_1/>.
In applying s 35(4), it must be recognized that equality does not always mean identical
treatment. Thus, s 35(4) would allow differential treatment in gender relations if such
distinctions did not constitute adverse discrimination. This could permit healthy gendered
traditions within Indigenous communities and these would be reinforced by s 25 of the
Charter, which prevents important collective rights from being eroded. As Justice Iacobucci
observed: “[T]rue equality does not necessarily result from identical treatment.” See Law v
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 25, 170 DLR
(4th) 1.
Some of the contours of s 35(4) could be drawn from Indigenous feminist scholarship. In
Sparrow, the Court wrote: “While it is impossible to give an easy definition of … rights,
it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the
meaning of the rights at stake.” Supra note 45 at para 69. For some examples of Aboriginal
women’s perspectives related to Aboriginal rights, see Joyce Green, ed, Making Space for
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addressing the complex extra-legal factors involved in violence against women,
section 35(4)’s protection could go some distance towards addressing the problem
of male domination within some Indigenous communities and leadership circles.
It could also be a significant political tool for addressing violence against women
long before courts or legislatures get around to recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction
relating to this issue.
In fact, difficulties related to gendered violence within Indigenous communities
are likely to remain problematic until they are subject to the full legal and political
force of section 35(4). Section 35(4) would play a greater role in Canada’s
Constitution if Aboriginal people exercised jurisdiction related to violence against
women under section 35(1) and Aboriginal political actors placed this principle
at the heart of their advocacy. When Indigenous peoples exercise their power
to make political decisions under section 35(1), the fuller promise of section
35(4) should become more apparent. It will operate to expand the protections
of Aboriginal women within their communities whenever women’s rights are
in question. Under this reading of section 35(4), there would be no possibility
of Indigenous communities using their authority to engage in any traditional,
customary, or other practice or law that subordinates women and subjects them
to any form of adverse discrimination.86 Section 35(4) could therefore have
considerable remedial effect, internally as well as externally, as Indigenous peoples
exercise greater authority under section 35(1). This could further alleviate concerns
flowing from having Indigenous communities deal with violence against women
while still being deeply mired in discrimination in too many quarters.
Finally, experience in the United States suggests that recognizing Indigenous
jurisdiction over violence against women at least partially counteracts aspects of
gendered discrimination within Indigenous communities. In pointing this out,
I am not suggesting that the United States should be the model for dealing with
violence against women in Canada. In fact, distinctive and significant challenges

Indigenous Feminism (Halifax: Fernwood, 2007); Bonita Lawrence & Kim Anderson, Strong
Women Stories: Native Vision and Community Survival (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2003).
86. Formal distinctions in treatment will sometimes be necessary to accommodate differences
between individuals and to thereby produce equal treatment in a substantive sense. For the
leading Canadian case, see Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143,
56 DLR (4th) 1. See also Minority Schools in Albania (1935), PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 64 at 17;
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 6 at
248. For an excellent discussion of Indigenous women and international human rights see
Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Women and International Human Rights Law: The Challenges
of Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and Self-Determination” (2010) 15:1 UCLA J Int’l L &
Foreign Aff 187.
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concerning violence against Indigenous women are present in the United States,87
as is the case with women in most societies throughout the world to greater
and lesser degrees.88 This comparative experience is only invoked to illustrate the
point that significant political mobilization can occur when Indigenous governments
take responsibility over this area. When the locus of political authority for dealing
with violence against women rests with Indigenous governments, they face much
greater internal and external pressure to take action in this field.89
On the internal side of the equation, chiefs and councils find that their electoral
prospects are tied to their effectiveness in addressing this issue.90 If they do not
take action on this front, their own constituents on the reservations demand that
they do so. When Indigenous communities exercise meaningful self-determination,
blame cannot be shifted as easily to other levels of government when faced with
such demands. Therefore, if leaders do not listen to these voices, their chances
of political success fade in some circumstances. While violence against women
is not the only issue competing for attention on Indigenous legislative agendas,
it has a high enough profile to be politically salient and generate extensive
legislation. An Indigenous leader who ignores this issue for an extended period
of time loses an important base of electoral support within his or her community.
If a candidate faces political uncertainty, the failure to take account of this issue
could be a swing factor in their electoral prospects. The internal incentives
created by the leadership and advocacy of many Indigenous women chiefs, leaders,
and organizations should not be overlooked when considering Indigenous
jurisdiction in this field.
As a result of these and other incentives, Native governments in the United
States have acted in significant ways to legislate in this field.91 A brief review of
tribal statutes demonstrates this fact. When Indigenous governments deal with
general issues related to violence against women outside the context of domestic
87. Kathie Dobie, “Tiny Little Laws: A Plague of Sexual Violence in Indian Country,” Harper’s
Magazine (February 2011) 55, online <http://harpers.org/archive/2011/02/tiny-little-laws/>.
88. Michael Penn & Rachel Nardos, Overcoming Violence Against Women and Girls: The
International Campaign to Eradicate a Worldwide Problem (Lanham, MD: Rowan Littlefield,
2003) at 1-13.
89. Some of this pressure is intensified by the inadequacy of federal law in this field. See Kevin
Washburn, “American Indians, Crime and the Law” (2006) 104:4 Mich L Rev 709 at 738.
90. For a discussion of the politics of violence against women, see Jacqui True, The Political
Economy of Violence against Women (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
91. United States, Tribal Law and Policy Institute, Tribal Legal Code Resource: Domestic Violence
Laws Guide for Drafting or Revising Victim-Centered Tribal Laws Against Domestic Violence
by (West Hollywood: The Institute, 2012) (Sarah Deer et al), online: <http://www.tribalinstitute.org/download/Amended%20Domestic_Violence_Code_Resource_2012.pdf >.
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violence, “it is not common to have a separate law on sexual assault jurisdiction
that differs from general criminal jurisdiction.”92 Thus, while some tribal
governments have specific provisions addressing sexual assault,93 most have allpurpose criminal codes invoking jurisdiction over violent crimes on a broader
level.94 Furthermore, most tribes also take general jurisdiction over this issue
through civil statutes.95 However, there is one special area of legislative activity
that deals specifically with violence against women on reserves: domestic violence
codes.96 In addition to their considerable detail, these ordinances often contain
important contextual statements outlining their purposes. In this way they set
the tone for discussion and action related to violence against women within
Native American communities. For example, the Fort Mohave Law and Order
Code expresses faith in the importance of law in reducing and deterring domestic
violence.97 The Hopi Family Relations Ordinance identifies the scope and tragic
92. United States, Tribal Law and Policy Institute, A Victim-Centered Approach to Sexual Violence
and Stalking Against Native Women: Resource Guide for Drafting or Revising Tribal Criminal
Laws Against Sexual Assault and Stalking, (West Hollywood, Cal: The Institute, 2012) (Sarah
Deer & Maureen L White Eagle) at 29.
93. See Hannahville Indian Community Criminal Sexual Conduct Code, § 1.2084; Nez Perce Tribal
Code, § 4-1-48; Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians, § 4; Blackfeet Tribal Law, c 5, § 9;
Skokomish Tribal Code, § 9.02A.020; Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice, c 2(C), § 224.
94. For examples of provisions outlining concurrent criminal law jurisdiction with the federal
government, see White Mountain Apache Criminal Code, § 1.2; White Earth Band of
Chippewa Judicial Code title 1, c 2, § 1.
95. See Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Domestic Violence Code, art I, § B; Sault Ste
Marie Tribal Code, § 34.102; Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians Domestic Violence
Code, § 5000; Ninilchik Village Ordinance No 99-01, § 3.
96. For examples of domestic violence provisions, see Makah Tribal Law and Order Code, title
11, c 1, § 11.1.04; Colville Law and Order Code, c 5-5; Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians
Domestic and Family Violence Ordinance, § 12.505; Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas Domestic
Violence Code, §§ 205(3), (7); Saginaw Chippewa Domestic Abuse Protection Code, c 1.241.
For examples of tribal court procedures, see Oglala Sioux Tribal Code, § 218; Oglala Sioux
Tribe Domestic Violence Code, § 99.2, c 1, § 214; Yakama Nation Domestic Violence Code, c
2, § 2.8. For examples of sanctions and victims’ rights, see Sault Ste Marie Tribal Code, § 75.103;
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, c 5, § 3; White Mountain Apache, c 6, § 6.3; Makah Tribal Code,
§ 11.4.09(h); Saginaw Chippewa Domestic Abuse Protection Code, § 1.2404; Omaha Tribe of
Nebraska, Domestic Violence Code, § 3.08; Muscogee (Creek) Nation Code, Domestic and Family
Violence, c 4, §3-401. For examples of protection orders, see Hopi Family Relations Ordinance, c
2, § 6.01; Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, § 1; Nez Perce Tribal Code, c 7, § 7-3-4;
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, tit 6, § 3-407(c); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Tribal Code, § 12.504;
Ninilchik Village Ordinance No. 99-01, § 11; Oglala Sioux Tribe, § 315; Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa Indians, Domestic Violence, § 3060. For examples of prevention and intervention
programs, see Oglala Sioux Tribe Domestic Violence Code, c 5, §506.
97. Fort Mojave Indian Reservation Law and Order Code, art XIII, c A § 1301.
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consequences of domestic violence for individuals, clans, and communities while
making specific mention of the fact that domestic violence is not just a “family”
matter.98 The Domestic Abuse of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code contains strong
statements criticizing the tribe’s past approaches to domestic violence,99 while the
Oglala Sioux Domestic Violence Code contains a bold declaration of purpose that
underlines the cultural inappropriateness of violence against women as well as
the importance of safety, protection, prosecution, and education in dealing with
this issue.100 These detailed statutes, along with tribal court cases that interpret
them, are evidence of the pressure tribes face within their communities to deal
effectively with domestic violence.101 Though progress is slow in overcoming this
scourge, they demonstrate that even communities facing high levels of trauma are
capable of developing a response to this crisis. Again, these examples are raised to
demonstrate the political implications of Indigenous jurisdiction.
Tribes in the United States also encounter external pressures to address gendered
discrimination as a result of their authority related to violence against women.
People outside the tribe organize themselves to persuade tribal councils to act
more constructively in this field. Externally generated pressure not only comes
from academics and policy institutes, but also from women’s organizations,102
tribal, state, and local governments,103 as well as international bodies.104 Moreover,
when tribes exercise jurisdiction, the US federal government is ironically more
active than its Canadian counterpart in the field of violence against women on
reserves, even as it acts sensitively to recognize Indigenous self-determination in
this field.105 Sustained legislative dialogues are developing between the federal and
Indigenous governments as violence against women is recognized as an important

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

104.

105.

Hopi Family Relations Ordinance, c 1, § 3.01.
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, title VII, §§ 1, 5-10.
Oglala Sioux Tribe Domestic Violence Code, title 99.2, c 1, § 101.
Donna Coker, “Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking” (1999) 47:1 UCLA L Rev 1.
See e.g. Collaboration to End Violence: National Aboriginal
Women’s Forum 2011, online: <http://www.nwac.ca/research/
collaboration-end-violence-national-aboriginal-womens-forum-2011>.
Office of Violence Against Women, Tribal Communities, (Washington DC: The United
States Department of Justice, 2013), online: <www.ovw.usdoj.gov/tribal.html> [Tribal
Communities].
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18
December 1979, Can TS 1982 No 31. See also Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women, GA Res 48/104, UNGAOR, 48 Sess, UN Doc/A/Res/48/104
(1993).
Tribal Communities, supra note 103.
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field of law-making activity within US First Nations communities.106 This
dialogue is leading to further innovation at the tribal level and spawning action
at the federal level to create frameworks to address this issue.
For example, tribes have worked with the federal government in the United
States to recognize more fully inherent tribal jurisdiction to deal with violence
against women and the need to provide resources and assistance in this regard.107
If such power were recognized in Canada, the federal government could likewise
consider legislation similar to statutes passed in the United States Congress. The
Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act (SAVE Native Women
Act), which was proposed as a stand-alone piece of legislation but has since become
Title IX of the Violence Against Women Act, was designed to allow tribes to make
fuller use of their own laws to address violence against women on reserves and
is an example of the type of action that governments could take to support
Indigenous communities.108 Since tribes in the United States clearly have
jurisdiction over their own members in this sphere,109 the Act acknowledges that
tribes possess jurisdiction over non-Indians110 who commit violent crimes against
106. United States, Tribal Justice and Safety, Indian Country Accomplishments of the Department of
Justice, (Washington: Department of Justice, 2013), online: The United States Department of
Justice <www.justice.gov/tribal/accomplishments.html>.
107. The failure to recognize and harmonize Indigenous jurisdiction with state and federal
jurisdiction is one of the most serious challenges in dealing with violence against Indigenous
women. See Sumayyah Waheed, “Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws,
Imperfect Solution” (2004) 19:1 Berkeley Women’s LJ 287.
108. The SAVE Native Women Act was designed to “decrease the incidence of violent crimes
against Indian women, to strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise the sovereign
authority of Indian tribes to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women,
and to ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women are
held accountable for that criminal behavior, and for other purposes.” It was incorporated
into the Violence Against Women Act upon reauthorization this year. Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act, USC 42 tit 9 § 901 (2013) amending 42 USC § 13925 (1994) [Title IX].
109. See Virginia H Murray, “A Comparative Study of the Historic Civil, Common and American
Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence” (1998) 23 Okla City UL Rev 433.
Professor Sarah Deer has also written extensively on the issue of tribal law in relation to
violence against women. See “Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety
and Sovereignty” (2009) 24:2 Wicazo SA Rev 149; Carrie A Martell & Sarah Deer, “Heeding
the Voice of Native Women: Toward an Ethic of Decolonization” (2005) 81:4 NDL Rev 807;
Sarah Deer, “Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and
Federal Indian Law” (2005) 38:2 Suffolk UL Rev 455; “Expanding the Network of Safety:
Tribal Protection Orders for Survivors of Sexual Assault” (2004) 4:3 Tribal Law Journal;
“Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape” (2004) 14:1 Kan JL and Pub Pol’y 121.
110. Title IX, supra note 108, s 904. This provision is designed to redress the US Supreme Court’s
conclusions that tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-Indians were limited. See
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women on Indian lands.111 At the same time, it recognizes that significant problems
exist for Indigenous women off-reserve. Thus, Title IX seeks to improve Native
programs under the Violence Against Women Act112 by enhancing data gathering
programs throughout the United States to better understand and respond to the
sex trafficking of Native women.113
It would be a groundbreaking development if section 35(1) were to
recognize that self-governing communities in Canada possess similar jurisdictional tools. This recognition would also be important in light of the fact that
much of the violence faced by Indigenous women occurs off reserves.114 In such
circumstances, Indigenous peoples might work with the federal government to
gather the type of data required under Title IX, which would bring resources
and attention to bear on issues arising from the over 580 missing and murdered
Indigenous women in Canada. This would make it easier to respond to the national
dimension of Canada’s current crisis because action would be taken on a governmentto-government basis. There is also great value in the Act’s recognition of the breadth
and scope of the problem involving violence against women.115 Acknowledgement of
harm is an essential step towards moving beyond it.116 When the SAVE Native
Women Act was introduced, its sponsor, Senator Akaka, said:
According to a study by the Department of Justice, two-in-five women in Native
communities will suffer domestic violence, and one-in-three will be sexually assaulted
in their lifetime. Furthermore, four out of five perpetrators of these crimes are nonIndian, and cannot be prosecuted by tribal governments. This has contributed to a
growing sense of lawlessness on Indian reservations and a perpetuation of victimization
of Native women.117

111.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

117.

respectively, Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe et al, 435 US 191 at 196, 98 S Ct 1011
(1978); Montana et al v United States, 450 US 544 at 564, 101 S Ct 1245 (1981); Nevada v
Hicks, 533 US 353 at 359-60, 121 S Ct 2304 (2001).
Title IX, supra note 108, s 904, amending Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC § 13011303. For further analysis of the problem of non-Indians and violence against women,
see Amy Radon, “Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian
Accountability on the Reservation” (2004) 37:4 U Mich JL Ref 1275.
Violence Against Women Act, 42 USC § 13925 (1994).
Title IX, supra note 108, s 907. See also Sarah Deer, “Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of
Native Women in the United States” (2010) 36:2 Wm Mitchell L Rev 621.
What Their Stories Tell Us, supra note 15.
Herman, supra note 59 at 175-94.
Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) at 121. However, for a critique of the potential
hollowness of acknowledgment without action, see Lee Taft, “Apology Subverted: The
Commodification of Apology” (2000) 109:5 Yale LJ 1135 at 1158-59.
Daniel K Akaka, Chairman Akaka introduces the SAVE Native Women Act (YouTube, at 1:00),
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Thus, while the legal context of the two countries is somewhat different, the
socio-cultural conditions between them are not greatly dissimilar when it comes
to Indigenous issues. In this light, Title IX is an important example of how
Indigenous groups could work with governments to address domestic violence
while enhancing community self-determination.118

II. SECTION 35(1) AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Having discussed reasons why Indigenous communities should not be excluded
from exercising jurisdiction related to violence against women, I turn now to the
essential question of how this issue could be framed within section 35(1) jurisprudence. As noted, violence against women will only receive the political attention
it deserves if Indigenous and Canadian governments treat it as a constitutional
issue while continuing to address its other dimensions (social dislocation,
poverty, colonialism, male domination on- and off-reserve, deficient fiscal policy,
et cetera). In raising this issue’s importance in the constitutional realm, Indigenous
peoples would have at least two options for asserting jurisdiction over violence
against women: They could bring a claim as either an Aboriginal right or a treaty
right. Unfortunately, given the narrow way in which the SCC currently frames
both of these rights, it is unlikely that a community would succeed under the
dominant interpretations of section 35(1). This conclusion may be viewed as a
reason for abandoning the Constitution’s Aboriginal provisions when dealing with
violence against women.
There is no question that section 35(1) has largely become a dead end in
challenging Canada’s continued colonial practices, particularly beyond cases that
involve the allocation of resources between the Crown and First Nations. Despite
its current weaknesses, however, I believe that there are at least two crucial
reasons for claiming jurisdiction related to violence against women under section
35(1). First, an application of the prevailing tests in section 35(1) jurisprudence
highlights fatal constitutional defects in present interpretive approaches. Second,
a discussion of section 35(1)’s interpretive flaws exposes latent alternative readings
that can be used to build a healthier jurisprudence. To be sure, it must be continually
emphasized that action in the field of violence against women must always be
broader than constitutional argument.119 However, it is also important that
online: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrXzcXynOd0>.
118. Title IX, supra note 108.
119. I have written elsewhere about the grassroots development of Indigenous institutions,
norms, and legal traditions. See, John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide (Toronto:
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constitutional avenues not be abandoned, because Indigenous women deserve
and require protection at the highest levels of constitutional law as well as within
the mundane details of everyday community life.
Thus, in considering Aboriginal peoples’ claims to section 35(1) rights in
relation to violence against women, the SCC’s current tests in the field of
Aboriginal and treaty rights will be outlined to reveal their critical defects. After
reviewing the Court’s dominant tests in each area, alternative arguments within
the existing jurisprudence will be canvassed to demonstrate how current laws
could be interpreted to protect against violence and enhance Indigenous selfdetermination in this important field.
A. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE
“INTEGRAL TO THE DISTINCTIVE CULTURE” TEST

Under the Court’s current approach to establishing Aboriginal rights (other than
Aboriginal title)120 within section 35(1), Indian, Métis, or Inuit groups must
demonstrate that a practice, custom, or tradition was “integral to their distinctive
culture” prior to European contact.121 Applying this test to a claim of Indigenous
jurisdiction in relation to violence against women, a court would insist on
precision in relation to the claim’s exact nature.122 This means that the potential
right must be framed as narrowly as possible in the first instance without an
excessive level of generality and it “must be looked at in light of the specific
circumstances of each case, and in light of the specific history and culture of the
Indigenous group claiming the right.”123 As noted above in Part I, Pamajewon
held that Aboriginal people could not claim “broad management rights over
reserve lands.”124 As a result of this specificity requirement, a community may
not be able to claim jurisdiction “for any and all purposes”125 related to domestic

120.

121.
122.
123.

124.
125.

University of Toronto Press, 2010); Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2010).
The distinction between Aboriginal rights and title was first identified in R v Adams, [1996] 3
SCR 101 at para 26, 138 DLR (4th) 657. The test for Aboriginal title was first articulated in
Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at para 143.
Van der Peet, supra note 24.
Ibid at para 53; Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 25; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada
(Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56 at para 46, 338 DLR (4th) 193 [Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band].
Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 27. For a discussion of this principle in relation to
Aboriginal governance, see John Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal Governance as
an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 285.
Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 27.
For a discussion of the precise identification of practices upon which rights can be claimed,
see Sappier, supra note 24 at paras 20-24.
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violence. Thus, under the dominant approach, the courts may insist that a group
plead the smallest increments of jurisdiction, such as the prevention of violence
or the punishment of people who were violent towards Indigenous women.126
Once a court has identified the correct (narrow) characterization of the claim,
it would require detailed evidence that violence against women, its prevention,
or the punishment of people who engage in it were “integral to the distinctive
culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”127
At this point, the test gets exceedingly messy for any Indigenous group
claiming domestic violence jurisdiction. For example, for an Indigenous group
to succeed, it would have to demonstrate that violence against women and
proactive responses to it were vital to the means by which it sustained itself prior
to European contact.128 It would have to show that its society would have been
“fundamentally altered” if such abuse did not occur and if the community did
not prevent or punish those responsible.129 Additionally, it would need to introduce
detailed proof of such facts in support of its claim, because a significant number
of Aboriginal rights cases have not succeeded due to findings that insufficient
evidence was presented at each stage of the test.130
The spectacle of such a case about violence against women and the evidence
it would highlight is difficult to imagine. First, a group would likely have to
produce both oral and written history demonstrating the structural nature of
violence against women in traditional Aboriginal society prior to European contact
and the society’s responses to this violence. Thus, lawyers would have to introduce
gruesome and widespread examples of pre-contact violence towards women along
with proactive (preventative or punitive) responses in order to show its “centrality”
to the community. To further complicate proof of jurisdiction, a community
would next have to establish a “reasonable degree of continuity” of violence and
response from contact to the present day, and demonstrate that modern practices
of violence towards women, and responses to it, have essential similarities to past

126. The characterization of Aboriginal rights often seems to be out of the hands of Aboriginal
people as courts routinely recharacterize claims in order to suit their view of the issue. For a
historian’s perspective on this process, see Arthur Ray, Telling It to the Judge: Taking Native
History to Court (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011).
127. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 46.
128. Ibid at para 4; Sappier, supra note 24 at para 38.
129. Sappier, ibid at para 39.
130. Aboriginal claims which failed due to lack of precise evidence include Van der Peet, supra note
24; Delgamuukw, supra note 24; Mitchell, supra note 27; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, supra
note 122.
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violence.131 An Indigenous group claiming this right would thus find itself spending
millions of dollars on experts and legal fees to shame itself before the courts with
such evidence.132
It is difficult to contemplate the prospect that any Indigenous group would
be willing to sustain such an inquiry due to the stereotypes it could evoke in
the public consciousness. Images of Indigenous men living in the pre-contact
forests of North America marginalizing, sexually assaulting, beating, and killing
Indigenous women would be difficult for any community to highlight, even if
their purpose was to focus on remedial practices. Furthermore, even if a group
surprisingly decided to expose themselves to this process and managed to escape
the media circus such evidence would raise, they would still be faced with the
next-to-impossible task of demonstrating that such activities, and proactive or
defensive responses to them, made their society what it was.133 Not to put too
fine of a point on this process, but it seems both racist and sexist in the extreme
to require Indigenous peoples to subject themselves to this spectacle in order
to prove that they have inherent constitutional power to prevent and sanction
members of their communities who are violent towards women today. Violence
against women has been deeply rooted in many societies throughout the ages ,134
yet non-Aboriginal governments do not have to subject themselves to this painful
self-criticism in order to exercise jurisdiction.135 The process Indigenous peoples
would have to follow to take effective legislative and judicial action in this sphere
shows a deep flaw in Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence.
What if Aboriginal communities somehow failed to produce sufficient evidence of pre-contact violence against women or their associated protections? It
seems absurd even to contemplate the implications of such an argument. And
even if the Crown managed to prove that Indigenous peoples were free of violence
131. Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, ibid at para 46.
132. Aboriginal peoples should not have to publicly shame themselves with detailed proof
of violence and effective response to take legislative and judicial action within their
communities, particularly when this is an issue that poisons every society. See Charlotte
Watts & Catherine Zimmerman, “Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude”
(2002) 359 Lancet 1232; UN Study of the Secretary-General, Ending violence against women:
from words to action (New York: UN, 2007); Andrea Parrot & Nina Cummings, Forsaken
females: the global brutalization of women (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
133. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 55. See also Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, supra note 122 at
para 46.
134. Parrot & Cummings, supra note 132.
135. For a discussion of these stereotypes in law, policy, and the media, see Robert F Berkhofer,
The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New
York: Random House, 1978).
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or lacked meaningful protections or sanctions against it, would this mean that
such communities could not respond to the current crisis on any meaningful
jurisdictional basis today? These arguments reduce Indigenous governments and
their constitutional status to the crudest caricatures and stereotypes, characterizing
Indigenous peoples as innocent children of the land or as brutal, uncivilized
savages of the forest.136
Yet, according to the dominant reading of the Constitution, section 35(1)
would frame discussions of violence against women in this very way. One
would hate to think that the point of section 35(1) is to shamefully marginalize
Indigenous governments and exclude their constitutional participation in
addressing their most pressing legal issues—particularly when reconciliation
and decolonization are supposed to be the constitutional goals.137 This cannot
be right, particularly when one remembers that the gender equality provisions of
section 35(4) are part of this constitutional mix. In light of the foregoing analysis,
it is clear that the “integral to a distinctive culture test” is fatally flawed when
read in light of the Constitution’s broader structure and purpose, and in the face
of present-day needs.138
B. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND TREATIES

Now that we have examined how violence against women would be addressed
under the dominant Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, I will briefly examine how
treaty rights might be deployed to deal with the same issue. We will see that the
Constitution’s treaty provisions are just as problematic as its so-called Aboriginal
rights protections. The Court’s treaty jurisprudence also emphasizes questionable
historic experience rather than engaging meaningfully with the real-world,
contemporary challenges faced by Indigenous women (and Indigenous
communities) today.
At present, treaty rights must be proven by reference to the common intention
between the relevant parties at the time the agreement was made.139 If a claimed
right was not “within the contemplation of the parties to the treaties,” it will not
136. Ibid.
137. Reconciliation as a constitutional goal within s 35(1) is discussed in Van der Peet, supra note
24 at paras 48-49; decolonization as a constitutional goal is expressed in Côté, supra note 45 at
paras 53, 59; Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 65. For a wide-ranging discussion of reconciliation
and decolonization, see Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools,
Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
138. For an alternative view, see Sharon D McIvor, “Aboriginal Women’s Rights as ‘Existing
Rights’ (Canada)” (1995) 15:2-3 Can Woman Stud 34.
139. Marshall, supra note 24 at para 14.

BORROWS, ABORIGINAL & TREATY RIGHTS 727

be recognized and affirmed under section 35(1).140 Thus, in order for Indigenous
peoples to succeed in claiming that they exercised jurisdiction over their members
who practiced violence towards women, they would have to prove that this
power was naturally within the contemplation of the parties when the treaty was
signed.141 Once this claim was proven, the Indigenous group would next have to
establish that the specific manner in which Aboriginal peoples wanted to exercise
the right was a “logical evolution” of the traditional practice contemplated by the
signers of the treaty.142 The scope of such evolution, however, must occur “within
limits [since their] subject matter cannot be wholly transformed.”143 While the
court will interpret treaties in a large, liberal, and generous manner, resolving
ambiguities in favour of Indigenous peoples,144 it will not recognize treaty rights
unrelated to historic context.145
As one might imagine, establishing Indigenous jurisdiction in relation to
violence against women on the basis of this test would likely be difficult. There
is no explicit treaty language in any agreement guaranteeing this right to Indigenous peoples. As a result, a court would have to inquire into whether this power
was implied by the broader context of the treaty.146 Such intention may be difficult
to discern given that First Nations and the Crown were not often bargaining
about the other party’s internal relations, particularly on the Indigenous
side of the agreement;147 they were largely focused on rights to land, trade,
and resources.148 They simply did not negotiate an entire way of life or how they
140. Ibid at para 13.
141. Ibid at para 78.
142. R v Marshall; R v Bernard, supra note 24 at paras 13, 16, 25; R v Morris, supra note 24 at
paras 16-32.
143. Marshall, supra note 24 at para 19.
144. Taylor and Williams, supra note 24; Simon, supra note 24; Horseman, supra note 24 at 907; Badger,
supra note 24 at paras 4, 41; Sundown, supra note 24 at paras 24-25; Marshall, ibid at paras 9-14;
R v Marshall; R v Bernard, supra note 24 at para 26; Morris, supra note 24 at para 19.
145. R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025, 70 DLR (4th) 427.
146. Ibid.
147. John J Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations SelfGovernment” (1992) 30:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 291 [Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law”]; John
Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and SelfGovernment” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law,
Equity, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).
148. For general treaty histories, see Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of
Saskatchewan: Our Dream is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000); Walter Hildebrandt et al, The True Spirit and
Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996) at 133; René
Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11 (Calgary:
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would live together in the future.149 Thus, it would be exceedingly unfair to construe
an agreement’s silences as a surrender of jurisdiction related to the health, safety,
and welfare of women in Indigenous communities.150
Since Indigenous peoples owned the land and exercised governance powers
prior to European arrival, treaties should be seen as a grant of rights from First
Nations to the Crown, reserving to the First Nations all rights not so granted.
On this view, First Nations would have retained broad jurisdiction over matters
not ceded through negotiations.151 Women’s rights were likely not within the
contemplation of non-Aboriginal negotiators when treaties were signed, given
the troubling attitudes towards women in English common law.152 While courts
may attempt to construe the peace and order clauses in the numbered treaties
as recognizing jurisdiction in this broad way,153 the SCC has warned that

149.
150.

151.

152.

153.

University of Calgary Press, 2004) at 74, 133, 240, 257, 314, 340, 502; Arthur J Ray, JR
Miller & Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000) at 116-17; William C Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties
on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002).
See generally JR Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
Silence in treaties is not to be construed against Indians. See R v Marshall; R v Bernard,
supra note 24 at para 104; R v Sioui, supra note 145. Courts require “strict proof of the fact
of extinguishment.” Badger, supra note 24 at para 41. The Crown has the onus of proving
that it clearly and plainly intended to extinguish an Aboriginal or treaty right and the “clear
and plain” hurdle for extinguishment is quite high. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 133.
For further discussion of the development of Indian canons of construction, see Leonard
Rotman, “Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal Rights
Jurisprudence” (1997) 46 UNBLJ 1.
United States v Winans (1905), 198 US 371 at 381, 25 S Ct 662. The US Supreme Court
stated: “In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
rights from them - a reservation of those not granted.”
For instance, the legal right for a man to “beat” his wife was only removed from English law
in 1891. See R v Jackson, [1891] 1 QB 671 at 682, 7 TLR 382 (CA). For a discussion of
women’s rights under the common law during this period, see Lori Chambers, “‘So Entirely
Under His Power and Control’: The Status of Wives before Reform” in Lori Chambers, ed,
Married Women and Property Law in Victorian Ontario (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, 1997) 14; Sarah Carter, “Categories and Terrains of Exclusion:
Constructing the ‘Indian Woman’ in the Early Settlement Era in Western Canada” in
Catherine Cavanaugh & Randi Warne, eds, Telling Tales: Essays in Western Women’s History
(Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000) 60; Constance Backhouse, Carnal Crimes: Sexual Assault
Law in Canada, 1900–1975 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
2008); Petticoats & Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada, (Toronto: The
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1991).
For insight into eyewitness interpretations of these agreements, see Peter Erasmus, Buffalo
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“‘[g]enerous’ rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of
after-the-fact largesse.” 154 Given the judiciary’s hesitancy to recognize broad jurisdiction in relation to other claims,155 it is unlikely that treaties will be a source of
Indigenous power to deal with violence against women.156 Like the jurisprudence
on Aboriginal rights, this too represents a significant flaw in Canada’s current
reading of the Constitution.

III. ALTERNATIVE SECTION 35(1) INTERPRETATIONS:
(AB)ORIGINALISM AND LIVING TREES
As the above review demonstrates, the Court’s dominant interpretation of treaty
rights under section 35(1) contains many similarities to the test for Aboriginal
rights. In order to succeed, claims in both categories must be rooted in historical
understandings of the right at the time of European interaction (through either
contact or negotiation). There are significant problems with this approach, as
discussed above. Fortunately, genuine alternatives are available when construing
Aboriginal and treaty rights within the existing jurisprudence that would
allow Indigenous peoples to possess greater responsibility for addressing violence
against women. There are at least two related strands of contemporary law that
could be applied to hold that Indigenous peoples retain rights to exercise jurisdiction
in relation to violence against women.
First, the courts could reject the idea that Aboriginal and treaty rights must
be solely rooted in the past.157 They could instead apply living tree jurisprudence

154.
155.

156.

157.

Days and Nights (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1976) at 248-49; Alexander Morris,
The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories Including
the Negotiations on Which they are Based, and Other Information Relating Thereto (Toronto:
Willing and Williamson, 1880) at 101-02.
Marshall, supra note 24.
Beattie v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 1998 1 FC 104,
[1997] FCJ 745; Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, supra note 28; Conseil des Innus
de Pessamit v Assoc des policiers et policières de Pessamit, 2010 FCA 306, [2010] FCJ No 1377;
Pamajewon, supra note 25.
Treaties “cannot be wholly transformed” by engaging in an “extended interpretation” of
their original meaning. See Marshall, supra note 24 at para 19. This view was reinforced in
R v Bernard where the SCC observed that an Aboriginal group’s historic “activity must be
essentially the same” as that occurring in the past in order for it to receive recognition. See
2005 SCC 43 at para 25, [2005] 2 SCR 220.
See John Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev
351 (for a discussion of the ideas developed in this section) [Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism”].
The argument in the next three paragraphs, including reproduction of selected arguments in
the text and footnotes, is derived from the same source.
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in recognizing and affirming Aboriginal and treaty rights under section 35(1).
Living tree reasoning is the dominant mode of constitutional interpretation in
Canada.158 Sadly, Indigenous peoples have not been allowed to litigate claims in
accordance with this doctrine.159 Section 35(1) jurisprudence has been developed
and applied in a discriminatory manner that places Indigenous peoples outside
the constitutional mainstream. Interpreting Aboriginal and treaty rights through
the same lens as other constitutional provisions would allow Indigenous peoples
to exercise jurisdiction in relation to violence against women.
Aboriginal and treaty rights are not interpreted in the same way as other
constitutional provisions: Aboriginal peoples can only possess constitutional
rights if they are rooted in the past.160 This is not true of other rights in Canada.
This mode of interpretation has elsewhere been called originalism.161 Originalism
158. A series of essays can be found on this topic in Ian Peach et al, eds, A Living Tree: The Legacy
of 1982 in Canada’s Political Evolution (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2007). Numerous cases
also uphold the dominance of living tree jurisprudence. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,
2004 SCC 79 at para 22, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Reference re Same-Sex Marriage]; British
Columbia (AG) v Ellett Estate, [1980] 2 SCR 466 at 478-79, 112 DLR (3d) 59 [Ellett Estate];
Canada (AG) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 94, [2007] 1 SCR 429; Re Residential Tenancies
Act, 1979, [1981] 1 SCR 714 at 723, 1981 CanLII 24; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British
Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] 2 SCR 486 at para 52, 24 DLR (4th) 536 [Reference re Motor
Vehicle Act]; Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can), ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 at para
9, [2005] 2 SCR 669; Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 SCR 158
at para 41, 81 DLR (4th) 16 [Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries]; R v Demers, 2004
SCC 46 at para 78, [2004] 2 SCR 489; Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22
at para 23, [2007] 2 SCR 3; Ontario Home Builders’ Assn v York Region Board of Education,
[1996] 2 SCR 929 at para 145, 137 DLR (4th) 449.
159. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at paras 39-40, [2003] 2 SCR 236 (seemingly foreclosing “living
tree” interpretations of section 35(1)).
160. Aboriginal and treaty rights are contingent upon a court constructing an original public
meaning for a past event, when such rights were first ‘recognized.’ See Van der Peet, supra
note 24 at para 28. Courts also look at when rights ‘crystallized.’ See Delgamuukw, supra note
24 at para 145. Otherwise, courts look to whether rights were ‘contemplated by the parties.’
See Marshall, supra note 24 at paras 58, 60. For a critique of the crystallization theory of
Aboriginal rights, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v
British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537 at 558.
161. For a discussion of originalism in the US context, see Robert H Bork, The Tempting of America:
The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Touchstone, 1990); Randy E Barnett, Restoring
the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004);
Steven G Calabresi, ed, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Washington DC: Regnery,
2007); Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) (for
an account of new originalism). For academic discussion of originalism in the Canadian
context, see Grant Huscroft & Bradley W Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of
Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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holds that parties cannot claim constitutional rights unless they were contemplated by the constitution’s founders, or expressed or implied in public debates
at the time when such provisions came into existence.162 The application of
originalism to Indigenous peoples is ironic because the SCC has explicitly
repudiated this doctrine in all other fields.163 In fact, it has boldly written that
“[t]his Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United States
of basing constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of the framers
of the Constitution.”164 While constitutional rights of all stripes find their genesis
in some historic moment, only Aboriginal peoples’ constitutional rights are limited
by such moments. Thus, originalism is inconsistent with Canada’s dominant
interpretive practices,165 which read the Constitution as a living tree.166
Interpreting section 35(1) as part of Canada’s living tree would help eliminate
the flaws described above in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights.167 Living
162. A Constitution’s public meaning and its founders’ intentions are not usually easy to agree
upon within an originalist framework. Jack M Balkin observes that: “Conceived most
broadly, ‘meaning’ includes a vast array of cultural associations, traditions, conventions,
and background assumptions.” See “Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism” (2012) 3
U Ill L Rev 815 at 828. Also see Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding” (1980) 60 BUL Rev 204; Mitchell N Berman, “Originalism Is Bunk” (2009)
84:1 NYL R 1; David A Strauss, The Living Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010); Robert W Bennett & Lawrence B Solum, Constitutional originalism: a debate (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2011); Thomas B Colby, “The Sacrifice of the New Originalism”
(2011) 99:3 Geo LJ 713.
163. See Justice Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” in Grant Huscroft
& Ian Brodie, eds, Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham: LexisNexis Canada,
2004) 345. Furthermore, the SCC did not respond positively to interpreting the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in light of the drafters’ intent. See Reference re Motor Vehicle
Act, supra note 158 at paras 49-50.
164. Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 SCR 327 at para 150, 107 DLR
(4th) 457. Academic commentary has also maintained that “originalism has never enjoyed
any significant support in Canada.” See Peter W Hogg, “Canada: From Privy Council to
Supreme Court” in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ed, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 55 at 83. But see Adam M Dodek, “The Dutiful
Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s Conception of Charter Rights and Their
Limits” (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev 331; Bradley W Miller, “Beguiled By Metaphors: The
‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22:2 Can JL &
Jur 331.
165. Justice Binnie, supra note 163 at 348.
166. See Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] AC 124 at para 44, [1929] UKPC 86.
167. At significant points in history, Indigenous peoples have also understood their constitutional
relations in living tree terms. See William N Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: a
political history of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press,
1998) at 73, 103.
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tree constitutionalism would allow courts to appropriately recognize and defer
to historic intentions and meanings at the time of contact or treaty but would
not exclude other “living” meanings that may be attributed to them.168 This
approach would respect historical context and guarantees while also bringing
the contemporary “living tree” conception to the forefront. A methodology that
venerates past and present human rights guarantees would be more consistent
with Canada’s Constitution than exclusive reliance on the “integral to a distinctive
culture” or “historic contemplation of the parties” tests currently dominating
section 35(1) jurisprudence.
If living tree principles were applied to Indigenous peoples, we might one
day say about Canada’s Aboriginal and treaty rights jurisprudence what has been
written about other areas of constitutional law: “This metaphor has endured
as the preferred approach in constitutional interpretation [dealing with Aboriginal
and treaty rights], ensuring ‘that Confederation can be adapted to new social
realities.’”169 We would have an Aboriginal jurisprudence that holds that “‘frozen
concepts’ reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles
of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living
tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the
realities of modern life.”170 We would also apply the view that “[t]here is nothing
static or frozen, narrow or technical, about the Constitution of Canada.”171
Thus, with respect to Aboriginal and treaty rights, we would say: “If the Canadian
Constitution is to be regarded as a ‘living tree’ and legislative competence as
‘essentially dynamic’…then the determination of categories existing in 1867
becomes of little, other than historic, concern.”172 This would allow us to reinforce
an approach that holds that “the past plays a critical but nonexclusive role in
determining the content of the rights and freedoms” within the Constitution.”173
As such, we could conclude in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights: “The tree
is rooted in past and present institutions, but must be capable of growth to meet

168. First Nations often described their constitutional relations by reference to living forces.
For example, treaties were to be for as long as the “sun shines, the river flows and the grass
grows.” When Alexander Morris proposed Treaty 6 he said: “What I trust and hope we will
do is not for to-day or to-morrow only; what I will promise and what I believe and hope you
will take, is to last as long as that sun shines and yonder river flows.” See supra note 155 at
202. See also ibid at 51 (for similar wording during Treaty 3 negotiations).
169. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, supra note 158 at para 42.
170. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 158 at para 22.
171. Ellett Estate, supra note 158 at para 29.
172. Ibid [emphasis in original].
173. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, supra note 158 at para 42.
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the future.”174 If originalism were rejected in favour of living tree constitutionalism,
Aboriginal and treaty rights would be more strongly rooted in “a philosophy
which is capable of explaining the past and animating the future.”175 Interpreting
Aboriginal and treaty rights as living traditions would mark an important
maturation point in the ongoing evolution of Canada’s organic Constitution.176
This would rank in significance alongside the achievement of responsible government,
the extension of women’s political rights, and the extension of civil rights before
the Charter came into force.177 We must not “read the provisions of the Constitution
like a last will and testament lest it become one.”178 This applies as much to
Aboriginal and treaty rights regarding violence against women as it does to other
parts of Canada’s Constitution.179
There is a second way of curing the flaws in the current approach to section
35(1) and thereby allowing Indigenous peoples to exercise jurisdiction over
violence against women in a manner consistent with section 35(4). This approach
is based on a related jurisprudential strand that regards broad jurisdictional
Aboriginal rights claims as pre-dating the creation of Canada and continuing
through to the present day. Courts have at times assumed that Indigenous peoples
exercised governance powers prior to Crown assertions of sovereignty without
requiring strict proof of such power.180 These are reasonable assumptions given
how jurisdiction is generally treated in the wider Canadian context.181 This is
also the legal justification for the exercise of Native self-governance in the United
States.182 This approach is also present within Canadian jurisprudence and could
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
176. John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 118-21.
177. William Kaplan, State and Salvation: The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Fight for Civil Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16
DLR (2d) 689; Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] SCR 100, 2 DLR 81; Saumur v City
of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299, [1953] 4 DLR 641; Switzman v Elbling, [1957] SCR 285, 7
DLR (2d) 337.
178. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc,
[1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155, 11 DLR (4th) 641.
179. This paragraph is taken from Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism,” supra note 157 at 397-98.
180. Chief Justice Lamer observed that Imperial powers treated Indians as independent nations.
Sioui, supra note 145 at para 69.
181. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at
para 32 [Haida Nation].
182. United States Department of the Interior, Handbook of Federal Indian Law by Felix S
Cohen (Washington: Department of Interior, 1941) at 122-23; Charles Wilkinson, American
Indians, Time and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) at 60.
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rightly be regarded as undergirding Indigenous jurisdictional issues in this field.183
For example, these powers were evident in Calder v AGBC, wherein Justice
Judson wrote: “[T]he fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there,
organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for
centuries.”184 Organization is essential to governance.185 The fact that Indigenous
peoples were “organized in societies” prior to the arrival of Europeans implies that
Indigenous governance, which includes the power to deal with violence against
women (in an admittedly imperfect way),186 was an important element of their
“pre-contact” societies.187 These governance powers were not voluntarily surrendered
as a result of the Crown’s own assertion of sovereignty.188 As has been noted,
Indigenous peoples continued to exercise their powers of governance after the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in many ways.189 Moreover, they continue to live
in “organized societies” in the present day by governing themselves in accordance
with their customs, laws, and traditions,190 though there has been extensive regulation
of these powers through instruments such as the Indian Act.191 Fortunately, as the
SCC noted in Sparrow, “that the right is controlled in great detail by the regulations
does not mean that the right is thereby extinguished.”192
Indigenous jurisdiction over violence against women could thus be
recognized under Canadian law through a broader reading of the doctrine of
continuity.193 As Chief Justice McLachlin succinctly stated in Haida Nation,
183. Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights,” supra note 26 at 6.
184. Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313 at 328, 1973 CanLII 4
[emphasis added].
185. This paragraph is largely extracted from John Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal
Governance as an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 285 at 292-93.
186. Robert A Williams Jr, “Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White
Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context” (1990) 24:4 Ga L Rev 1019.
187. The reserved rights theory of Aboriginal governance is also consistent with the proposition
articulated by the SCC in Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 30.
188. However, it has been held that “discovery” diminished Indian rights to land. See Guerin v
Canada [1984] 2 SCR 335 at para 88, 13 DLR (4th) 321.
189. The SCC accepted the idea in Sioui, supra note 145. The Court cites Worcester v State of
Georgia, 31 US 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832).
190. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra note 120 at 196; John Borrows, “Stewardship and the
First Nations Governance Act” (2003) 29:1 Queen’s LJ 103.
191. For example, First Nations exercise pre-existing governance powers through the Indian
custom council system under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. The legislation makes
reference to “custom of the band” (at s 2(1)).
192. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 36. For an application of this principle in a specific
community context, see Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law,” supra note 147.
193. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 41. Numerous cases have proceeded
under the doctrine of continuity. See Johnstone v Connolly (1869), 17 RJRQ 266, 1 CNLC
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“[p]ut simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and
were never conquered.”194 The Canadian government has also recognized an
approach to Aboriginal self-government that draws upon the doctrine of continuity.195
These views assume the existence of Indigenous governance powers and bring life
to Canada’s living tree, thereby correcting flaws in current interpretive approaches.196
As Chief Justice McLachlin wrote in Mitchell:
European settlement did not terminate the interests of aboriginal peoples arising
from their historical occupation and use of the land. To the contrary, aboriginal
interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty,
and were absorbed into the common law as rights.197

Indigenous women should be able to claim Aboriginal rights to safety within
their societies under the doctrine of continuity. This approach does not require
Indigenous peoples to prove historical exercise of each small increment of jurisdiction under the “integral to a distinctive culture” test. It also demonstrates that
Canada’s Constitution does not have to be read in ways that are inconsistent with
its broader aims. Pamajewon will not be the last word in defining Aboriginal
governance rights under section 35(1),198 and the prominence of the doctrine
of continuity can be an important antidote to the flaws outlined earlier in
this section.199

194.
195.

196.

197.
198.
199.

151 (CA), aff’g Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75, 1 CNLC 70 (Qc Sup Ct); R v
Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889), 1 Terr LR 211, 1889 CarswellNWT 14 (WL Can) (NWT CA); R
v Bone (1899), 4 Terr LR 173, 3 CCC 329 (NWT SC); Re Noah Estate (1961), 32 DLR (2d)
185, 36 WWR 577 (NWT TC); Re Deborah E4-789, [1972] 5 WWR 203, 28 DLR (3d)
483 (NWT CA); Michell v Dennis and Dennis, [1984] 2 CNLR 91, 2 WWR 449 (BC SC);
Casimel v Insurance Corp of British Columbia (1991), 58 BCLR (2d) 316, [1992] 1 CNLR
84 (SC); Vielle v Vielle (1992), 93 DLR (4th) 318, [1993] 1 CNLR 165 (Alta Prov Ct (Fam
Div)).
Haida Nation, supra note 181 at para 24.
The federal government has recognized that Aboriginal peoples possess unextinguished
inherent rights to govern themselves. See Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Government of Canada’s Approach to
Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government
(Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1995), online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.
gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844>.
For an example of the wide scope of Aboriginal governance powers under the doctrine of
continuity, see Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2000 BCSC 1123 at paras
65-81, 189 DLR (4th) 333.
Mitchell, supra note 24 at para 10.
Chief Justice Lamer expressed hesitation in applying the “integral to a distinctive culture” test
to the claim of self-government. See Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at paras 170-71.
Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights,” supra note 26 at 20-48.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Violence against women should not be labelled an Indigenous tradition.200 It is
a very complex and serious socio-legal issue that has significant implications for
how jurisdiction, law, and legal traditions are taught, practiced, critiqued, and
reformulated.201 This article has argued that violence against Indigenous women
must be confronted at all levels of society. In particular, this issue must be
addressed from a jurisdictional perspective since violence is linked to the inequalities
Indigenous peoples face within Indigenous communities and in Canadian society
more generally. Unfortunately, at least two stereotypes stand in the way of such
action. One is the misperception that Indigenous communities would be
incapable of effectively addressing this issue due the high levels of violence they
encounter. The second relates to the courts’ interpretive misperception that history
must be the sole source of Indigenous jurisdictional claims under section 35(1)
of the Constitution. While important truths underlie each viewpoint (violence
within communities does raise distinct challenges in dealing with this issue, and
attentiveness to history is crucial, though not determinative, in understanding
Aboriginal and treaty rights), they do not justify the cramped and distorted
approach to Indigenous jurisdiction over violence against women that characterizes
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence in Canada. This article has attempted
to calibrate more precisely a nuanced approach to these issues in light of broader
policy and jurisprudential realities.202

200. Andrea Smith, “Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples” (2003)
18:2 Hypatia 70.
201. Val Napoleon, Hadley Friedland & Emily Snyder, eds, Thinking About and Practicing With
Indigenous Legal Traditions: One Approach: A Community Handbook [on file with author].
202. The teaching of Indigenous legal traditions in Canadian law schools must also draw on the
insights developed in this article. Gender and the elimination of violence against women
is a necessary site of inquiry and action for working with Indigenous peoples’ own laws.
Tradition, whether Aboriginal or Canadian, must not be essentialized nor regarded as
being homogenous, objective, neutral, or necessarily equality-enhancing just because it is
“tradition.” We must constantly subject all our laws to these inquiries in order to ensure that
all to whom they apply are safe from violence in any form.

